Strike Eagle or Struck Turkey?
By ringisei on 27 Nov 2008 4:10 PM
Comments (5)

Sometime between Teh Joo Lin's 3 Nov Straits Times article ('RSAF's first F-15 leaves Boeing factory') and David Boey's 26 Nov piece ('Strike Eagle with zero combat defects'), the F-15's win ratio rose from 101 to 0 to 104 to 0. While it is true that the F-15 will be 'another significant milestone' for the RSAF, I'd like to make three bohliao-kaypoh comments.

Less is more? The cost of new generation fighters has been increasing steeply. Getting and delivering value for money has been a key concern for all defence establishments. The 24 F-15SGs will be replacing the fleet of around 40 A4SU Super Skyhawks and it is claimed that they will deliver even more bang despite their reduced numbers. However, in the introduction to a recent edited volume (Military Transformation and Strategy), Dr Bernard Loo warned that smaller numbers will make 'the loss of even a single platform all the more costly, and potentially strategically disastrous.' We've seen how the numerical matters with respect to 'boots on the ground' but how far will this extend to wings in the air?

New is old? It's a pity that Teh's article described the A4SU as 'Vietnam-era'. That is certainly true for the A4 line but not the A4SU series. Just as how Boey's article emphasized not insignificant local input into the F-15SG; the A4SU had also, previously, been held up as an earlier example of how our local defence technology establishment could upgrade foreign platforms. Ironically, the F-15 line is no spring chicken either; it was first delivered to a combat wing in 1976. Will the F-15SG get leapfrogged by surprise regional acquisitions of the JSF or F-22?

Fit for purpose? The F-15SGs will be key to generating the type of conventional airpower required for the RSAF's core mission of deterring potential aggressors. However, I am also reminded of how less glamorous RSAF assets such as helicopters (especially the Chinooks), refueling tankers (KC-135) and transport aircraft (like the C-130) have been in rather more demand for UN peacekeeping (e.g. Timor Leste), coalition operations (Ops Blue Orchid in Iraq) as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Ops Flying Eagle for the 2004 tsunami). Should more have been invested in the latter set of capabilities?

Comments (5)

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Huichieh [TypeKey Profile Page]:

Will the F-15SG get leapfrogged by surprise regional acquisitions of the JSF or F-22?

My sense is "No". Or more precisely, "yes" but doesn't really matter.

The only people in the region to whom the US will sell the JSF--and who can afford it--are also people against whom it is extremely unlikely that we will ever have to fight. In any case, it is probable (I'm guessing here) that the RSAF will be among the very first in the region to acquire the JSF.

The US will most likely not sell the F-22 period. If they do, they will sell it to the Japanese (highly unlikely) and perhaps the Australians (even less likely).

Your first and second concerns ar4e in tension. If we spend the same $$$ to get more units of a cheaper plane, we definitely run a higher risk of being leapfrogged. But if we get less units of a more expensive plane, we may end up with less units than we really ought to have. (My own guess is that 24 is not necessarily the final number. Depending on the schedule of JSF delivery, it is possible that we might end up with many more F-15SGs. Some people are saying up to 80, not that I have any idea.)

Sympathetic to the third concern. But its not as if the SAF is low on these assets given our size. (If memory serves, we contributed a significant chunk of the heli force for Tsunami relief even counting the US presence.)

Fox:

The F-15SG is a derivative and not a mere copy of the original F-15. Whilst the USAF are going to replace their F-15C/D's with F-22's, there are no plans to phase out their F-15E's.

"Fit for purpose? The F-15SGs will be keen to generating the type of conventional airpower required for the RSAF's core mission of deterring potential aggressors."

Yes. More specifically, the F-15SG is to serve as a strike fighter. The RSAF is not going to use it as an air superiority platform but as a strike aircraft. In other words, it will be used to bomb ground targets, which was the role played by the A-4SU's.

Talk about it being leapfrogged by the F-22 doesn't quite jive. The F-22 is an air superiority platform, not a strike fighter.

ringisei:

Loy and Fox, thanks for your points.

24 may not be the final number. The original number mentioned in Dr Loo's chapter was 12; the Pentagon's notifications to Congress have only dealt with pilot training, munitions etc but not the actual aircraft themselves so we'll have to wait and see. 80 seems a bit much though.

Regarding tsunami relief, my impression was that our Chinooks played an important role throughout, esp for heavy lift, but the US contribution was, to put it mildly, considerable. And from what my friends told me, our assets were also very stretched.

Grateful for enlightening me on strike vs. air superiority.

What are the possibilities of the emergence of fundamentally disruptive technologies that renders fighter-bombers less useful/more vulnerable?

Fox:

As for the number of aircraft, there are two points to note:

1. the A-4SU is a single-seater while the F-15E is a two-seater. Hence, the pilot manpower requirement for 24 F-15E's is actually greater than that for 40 A-4SU's. I personally doubt that the RSAF will acquire that many more F-15E's if any at all.

2. the F-15E can carry about 11,000 kg of external payload while the A-4SU can carry about 4,500 kg of external payload.

"However, I am also reminded of how less glamorous RSAF assets such as helicopters (especially the Chinooks), refueling tankers (KC-135) and transport aircraft (like the C-130) have been in rather more demand for UN peacekeeping (e.g. Timor Leste), coalition operations (Ops Blue Orchid in Iraq) as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Ops Flying Eagle for the 2004 tsunami)."

Refueling and aerial transport aircraft can also be used for extending the range of fighter/strike aircraft and for airlifting troops/military equipment respectively. Hence, they are no less threatening to our neighbours than fighter aircraft.

Very interesting discussion on a topic that I am totally unfamiliar with, and Ringisei, clever funny title! So in the end, what does it mean for RSAF modernisation? Should we get more strike/air superiority planes as they are more sexy and punchy for the sake of the appearance of deterrence, or should more resources be devoted to "uncool" areas like air defence systems or Air Power Generation Command as reported recently? How is the tightrope walked?

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